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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the difference in assets between 
the companies that have agency problem and no agency problem. Agency 
problem in this paper is peroxided by cash flow right leverage. Leverage 
indicates the difference between control rights and cash flow of controlling 
shareholder. If the control rights are greater than cash flow rights, it 
indicates there are agency problem in the company. It happens because 
the control of the controlling shareholder in the company is more dominant 
than the shareholder’s claim to the company. This condition is incentive to 
motivate the controlling shareholder to extract the company’s assets for 
his/her private benefit. This is attributable to the controlling shareholder 
protected by control rights. If the cash flow rights are high and as well as 
the control rights, it indicates that there is no agency problem in the 
company. This condition indicates that the claims value of the controlling 
shareholder against the company’s profit is same as the control of the 
controlling shareholder. To prove empirical evidence, this paper uses the 
sample of the manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange during the period 2000-2007. The result of analysis of this paper 
shows that there are differences in assets between the existing agency 
problem and no agency problem. The assets of the company which exist 
the agency problem is lower than the assets of the company which is not 
agency problem. Therefore, the hypothesis of this study is supported. 
 
Keywords: assets, agency problem, control rights, cash flow rights, cash 
flow right leverage. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This study aims to extend the results of research conducted by Sanjaya (2011a) 
and (2011b). Sanjaya (2011a) found that public companies are owned by immediate 
(immediate ownership) which is still very limited. It is only 3.79% of all manufacturing firms 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) during the period 2001-2007. The remaining 
96.21% public companies in the manufacturing industry are owned by ultimate (ultimate 
ownership). Ultimate ownership is the ownership either directly or indirectly to a public 
company. The largest ultimate owner is as the controlling shareholder (controlling 
shareholder). Controlling shareholder is individuals, families, or institutions (such as 
governments, financial institutions are widely held, widely-owned companies or others) 
who have control of a company either directly or indirectly at cut off certain control rights 
(Claessens et al., 2000). 
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According to Sanjaya (2011a), the public company dispersed ownership at cut off 
10% control rights is 0.49%. Sanjaya (2011a) also found that almost all public companies 
in the manufacturing industry listed on the Stock Exchange are controlled by the 
controlling shareholder. Based on cut off 10% control rights, there are 99.51% of public 
companies in the manufacturing industries listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
having a concentrated ownership structure. Although using cut off 20% control rights, the 
concentrated ownership of the manufacturing companies listed on the Stock Exchange is 
still high at 92.71%. Even with cut off 30% control rights, there are 81.82% of the public 
companies controlled by the controlling shareholder. 
The results of Sanjaya (2011a) are not much different from some studies such as 
La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002). Claessens et 
al. (2000). They suggest that the concentrated ownership of the public companies in Asia 
is the highest in the amount of 93%. Claessens et al. (2000) found that in many Asian 
countries there is still concentrated ownership above 90%, as Hong Kong (99.4%), 
Malaysia (99.0%), Singapore (98.6%), Thailand (97.9%), and Taiwan (97.1%). 
Concentrated ownership in Indonesia is higher than average the concentrated ownership 
of the public companies of the world which is recorded by La Porta et al. (1999) such as 
Europe, America, Asia, and Australia is 76% at cut off 10% control rights. 
Based on this phenomenon, Sanjaya (2011b) conducted a subsequent study of 
agency problems which is occurred in Indonesia. An agency problem which is occurred in 
Indonesia is between controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders and not 
between manager and shareholder. Agency problem is demonstrated by the difference 
between control rights and cash flow rights. It is called the cash flow right leverage. The 
leverage is the source of agency problem in the concentrated ownership. The ownership 
mechanism which is used to increase the leverage is through pyramid structures. There is 
63.97% owned by the pyramid at cut off 10% control rights. 
Two studies of Sanjaya motivate the author to give evidence empirically whether 
the impact of these agency problem in the assets of the firm. As far as the authors know 
the research agency problem between shareholders and its impact on the assets of the 
firm has not been done in Indonesia. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to investigate 
empiricallywhetherthere is the different of assets between companies which have 
corporate agency problem and no agency problem. 
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II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2. 1. AgencyTheory  
To explain the agency problem in Indonesia, researchers should be more careful 
to indentify agency problem.The agency problem which is known by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) between shareholders and managers is not appropriate to explain and predict the 
phenomenon of agency problem in Indonesia. Some researchers argued that the agency 
problems which is occurred in Indonesia is between shareholders and managers. 
The ownership of the public companies in the United States and United Kingdom 
differ with the ownership of the public companies in East Asia including Indonesia and 
Eastern Europe. The ownership in the United States and United Kingdom are dispersed 
while the ownership in East Asia and Eastern Europe are concentrated. This phenomenon 
is demonstrated empirically by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000). In 
companies with dispersed ownership, individual shareholders can not control the 
management. Agency problem arising from the dispersed ownership is between manager 
and shareholder because manager is more control the company. In such cases, the 
manager will not act in the best interests of the shareholder because manager also 
increases to improve his personal benefit. It encourages managers to exploit the 
company's assets for his personal benefit. For the concentrated ownership, the company 
is controlled by the controlling shareholder. In fact, corporate manageris member of 
controlling shareholder family. In such case, the agency problem switches from 
shareholder and manager to controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest the corporate governance is agency 
perspective which is referred as the separation between ownership and control. Managers 
control the company in the dispersed ownership. Manager obtainsfunds which are used 
productively to grow the company. Investors as owners need the good manager to 
manage the company for their return from the investment. In fact there is the issue how 
investors can convince themselves that they will receive return from their investment. This 
concern makes sense because managers tend to expropriation. Expropriation is the use 
of control to maximize their own welfare which harmsthe others (investors). 
As a result of the expropriation, the shareholders substantially organized 
themselves into a controlling shareholder to get the information and closely monitor to 
manager. Controlling shareholder has a large enough control to pressure on manager. 
However, the new controlling shareholder leads agency problem because controlling 
shareholder control the company to satisfy personal benefit.In such case, the controlling 
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shareholder takes benefit only for himself. It harms to non-controlling shareholders. It 
occurs because the control rights of controlling shareholders are more than cash flow 
rights. With the greater control rights, the controlling shareholder can influence the 
decisions of managers as to pay special dividends and exploit business relationships 
between companies which are in his/her control. 
La Porta et al. (1999) is the first researcher to evaluate the potential agency 
problem between controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders whether the 
cash flow rights are substantially different from the control rights. According to Claessens 
and Fan (2002), agency conflicts occur because there is a large deviation between control 
rights and cash flow rights. If the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholderis close to 
or the same with the control rights, there is not the agency problembetween controlling 
shareholder and non-controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholder uses the strategy 
to own the company by of pyramid ownership and cross ownership to increase the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights. The ownership of the company is 
represented by common stock. 
The increase in control rights of common stock lead the controlling shareholder to 
expropriate the company’s assets to increase his/her private benefits. With the strong 
control, the controlling shareholder can exploit the company's assets so that the 
company's value decreases. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 759), "as ownership 
gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain nearly full control and prefer to use 
firms to generate private benefits of control That are not shared by minority shareholders". 
The opinion of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is consistent with the argument of the negative 
entrenchment effect which suggeststhat the controlling shareholder are motivated to use 
their control rights to her/his private benefit (Yeh, 2005). 
The controlling shareholder with the strong control rights uses the company for 
personal benefit rather than the interests of non-controlling shareholders. It implies that 
there is entrenchment effect. According to Fan and Wong (2002), entrenchment is the act 
of the controlling shareholder which is protected by control rights for abuse of power such 
as expropriation (Fan and Wong, 2002). Fan and Wong (2005) and Yeh (2005) also 
confirmed the same to this argument.Entrenchment effects include the expropriation of the 
company’s earnings which are transferred to other companies that are still controlled by 
the controlling shareholder. Controlling shareholder can also do the expropriation by the 
actions which do not maximize the company’s earnings. Some researchers found the 
effect of entrenchment such as Claessens et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2002), Lins 
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(2003), and Siregar (2006). The researchers documentedthat the increasing in the control 
rights of the controlling shareholdernegatively affect to the market value and dividends. 
These results confirme that the increasing of control rights will be the lower the value of 
the firm and the paid dividend. 
The controlling shareholder also hasthe cash flow rights. This rights can prevent 
the controlling shareholder wishes to expropriate the non-controlling shareholders and the 
company. The biggerconcentration of the cash flow rights is incentive for the controlling 
shareholder to control company properly. It implies the effect of alignment. Alignment is 
the controllingshareholder actions are aligned with the interests of the non-controlling 
shareholder. The increasing of the cash flow rights in the hands of a controlling 
shareholder lead to increasing the financial incentives. The increasing of the cash flow 
rights will motivate controlling shareholder to align their interests with the company or a 
non-controlling shareholders. 
Cash flow ownership by controlling shareholder can reduce the motivation of the 
controlling shareholder to expropriate the company’s assets. Even the controlling 
shareholder desires to increase paid cash dividend (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Cash 
flow rights are greater commitment to the controlling shareholders to no expropriate the 
company’s assets (La Porta et al., 1999) because the expropriation alsoharms to the 
controlling shareholder (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Gomes (2000) also comments the 
same opinion. 
Some researchers documented the implications of the alignment effect such as 
Claessens et al. (1999), La Porta et al. (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Siregar 
(2006). These researchers founded that the cash flow rights increase the value of the firm 
and dividend. 
2.2. Common Stock 
According to Hartono (2009), shareholder is the owners of the company that 
represents to management to manage the company’s operation. As the owner of the 
company, the shareholder of the common stock has some rights such as the control 
rights, cash flow rights, preemptive rights, and rights of residual claims. 
2.2.1. Control Rights 
 Control rights are the rights of common stockholders to elect the board of 
directors. This definition suggests that common stockholders have the right to control who 
will manage the company. Common shareholders can exercise their right to veto the 
election of the board of directors at the annual meeting of shareholders or veto the actions 
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that require shareholder approval. According to Kim and Yi (2006), the control rights are 
the total percentage of shares held by common shareholders. Control rights are the rights 
of common stockholders to elect the board of directors and other policies such as the 
issuance of securities, stock splits, and substantial changes in the operating company (Du 
and Dai, 2005). According to La Porta et al. (1999), the control rights are the voting rights 
to participate in setting corporate policy. 
In the context of ultimate ownership, control rights include direct and indirect 
control rights. Direct control rights are the percentage of the common stock owned by 
controlling shareholder on behalf of himself at a company. This right is the same as the 
direct cash flow rights. Indirect control rights are the sum of the minimum control in any 
chain of ownership (La Porta et al., 1999). Thus, the control rights are the amount of direct 
and indirect control rights. 
2.2.2. Cash Flow Rights 
Cash flow rights or the right to receive the company’s profits is the right of common 
shareholders to receive part of company’s profits. This right reflectshe right of common 
stockholdersto receive cash flow from the company’s profits. Not all profits can be 
distributed.Some profits will be reinvested into the company that is often referred as 
retained earnings. Retained earnings are the company's internal resources. Retained 
earnings are not distributed as dividends. Not all companies pay dividends. If the 
company decides to divide the dividend, all common shareholders get dividends based on 
the percentage of cash flow rights. According to Kim and Yi (2006), cash flow rights are 
the percentage of shares held by controlling shareholder. Ownership refers to the cash 
flow rights (Du and Dai, 2005). Cash flow rights are financial claims against to the 
company (La Porta et al., 1999). 
In the context of ultimate ownership, the right cash flow comprises the direct and 
indirect cash flow rights. The direct cash flow rights are the percentage of shares held by 
shareholders in public companies on his behalf. The indirect cash flow rights are the 
number of multiplications shareholders ownership percentage in each chain of ownership. 
Cash flow rights are the percentage of the direct and indirectlycash flow rights. 
2.2.3. Preemptive Rights 
Preemptive rights are the rights of the common stockholders to obtain the same 
percentage of stock ownership when the company issued additional shares. If companies 
do this, the number of outstanding shares will be more and consequently the percentage 
ownership of the last shareholders will drop. To maintain the percentage of ownership, the 
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preemptive rights to give priority the last shareholders to purchase additional new shares 
so that the percentage of ownership does not change. 
2.3. Previus Researchers  
Claessens et al. (1999) investigated the relationship between corporate ownership 
structure in East Asia and the performance of the company. Claessens et al. (1999) found 
the concentration of cash flow rights increase the value of the firm. The control rights 
negatively affect to the value of the market. Wedge is a value that indicates the difference 
between the value of control rights and cash flow rights. The greater wedge between cash 
flow rights and control rights associated with a reduction in the value of the firm.Faccio et 
al. (2001) invesitaged the dividend behavior which connecte to  the structure of the 
ownership and control. The sample in this study are companies in Europe and Asia. 
Faccio et al. (2001) found that the ratio of cash flow rights/control rights is positively 
related to dividends. This result confirms that the greater agency problem in the company 
will be  less paid dividends.  
La Porta et al. (2002) studied the effect of cash flow rights on the firm value. 
Samples were taken from 539 large companies in 27 countries. La Porta et al. (2002) 
found that cash flow rights has a positive effect on the value of the firm. It means thatthe 
increasing of the cash flow rights of the company will increase the value of the 
firm.Claessens et al. (2002) studied the effect of ownership structure of public 
corporations in East Asia against to the value of the firm. Sample is taken from the 1301 
companies in 8 countries of East Asia. The results of Claessens et al. (2002) are 
consistent with previous research that the increasing of the cash flow rights will increase 
the value of the firm. However, Claessens et al. (2002) found that the control 
rightsnegatively effect to the velue of the firm. It means that the increasing of the control 
rights of controlling shareholder will decrease the value of the firm. 
Lins (2003) studied the relationship between stock ownership by management and 
stock ownership non-management blockholder and the value of the firm in 18 emerging 
market countries. Lins (2003) found that the velue of the firm will be lower when 
management control by the larger companies. Lins (2003) also found the positive 
association between non-management blockholders and the value of the firm for countries 
which apply low legal protection.Lemmon and Lins (2003) studied the differences in the 
corporate ownership structure which can explain differences in the performance of the 
company during the financial crisis in East Asia on July 1997. Data were collected from 
Woldscope for 800 companies in East Asia. Lemmon and Lins (2003) measures the 
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degree of separation of ownership and control which is indicated by the cash flow right 
leverage. Lemmon and Lins (2003) found that the value of the firm is negatively related to 
the separation of cash flow rights and control rights. 
Siregar (2006) studied the effect of cash flow rights, control rights and cash flow 
right leverage on the value of the firm and dividends. Siregar (2006) used all companies 
listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Siregar (2006) found that the cash flow rights 
positive effect on the value of the firm and cash dividends. The control rights negative 
effect  to cash dividends. 
2.4. The Research Hypothesis 
Claessens et al. (1999) empirically investigated the influence of the corporate 
ownership structure in East Asia to the performance of the company. Researchers were 
using the wedge that shows the difference between control rights and cash flow rights of 
controlling shareholder. Wedge is also often referred to as cash flow right leverage. 
Claessens et al. (1999) found that the wedge negatively affect the value of the company. 
This means the wedge or cash flow rights leverage as a proxy for agency problem affect 
firm value. The increasing cash flow rights leverage means the increasing agency problem 
which reduce the value of the firm.Faccio et al. (2001) investigated the dividend behavior 
which is related to the structure of ownership and control. The sample in this study 
iscompanies in Europe and Asia. Faccio et al. (2001) used the ratio of cash flow rights 
divided by control rights. If this ratio is greater, the agency problem in the company is 
small. Conversely if the ratio is smaller,the agency problem in the company is large. 
Faccio et al. (2001) found that cash flow rights/control rights is positively related to 
dividends. This result indicates that the company is not interested to pay dividend as the 
greater agency problem in the company. Conversely, the company is interested to pay 
dividend as the smaller agency problem. 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) investigated the differences in corporate ownership 
structures which are used to explain differences in performance of the company during the 
financial crisis in East Asia in July 1997. Researchers used the cash flow right leverage to 
measure degree of difference between control rights and cash flow rights. Leverage is 
calculated as the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights. Lemmon and Lins (2003) found 
the negative value of the company which is related to the difference between cash flow 
rights and control rights.Siregar (2006) investigated the effect of control rights and cash 
flow right leverage on the value of the firm and dividends. Siregar used the company listed 
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Siregar (2006) found that cash flow rights leverage 
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which is interacted with shareholder engagement as manager of the company negatively 
affect to dividend. 
There are some negative impacts the increasing agency problem for companies 
and non-controlling shareholders. In the context of concentrated ownership, agency 
problem is peroxidedby difference between cash flow rights and control rights of 
controlling shareholder. This difference is often referred as cash flow right leverage. The 
leverage is calculated by the control rights minus cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholder. If the leverage is greater,it indicates a large agency problem because control 
of the company by controlling shareholder is greater than the claim to corporate profits by 
controlling shareholder. This condition encourage controlling shareholder to expropriate 
the company's assets for personal benefit. These conditions indicate the implications of 
entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder.Conversely if the leverage is smaller,it 
indicates a small agency problems because cash flow rights of controlling shareholder 
which is close or same with the control rights. If the controlling shareholder expropriate the 
company’s asset,  the controlling shareholder also loses because the controlling 
shareholder will reduce his/her claims for the company’s profit. This condition describes 
the implications of the alignment effect of the controlling shareholder. 
Based on the conditions, the author expects that the greater agency problem leads 
the controlling shareholder to make expropriate. This expropriation can reduce the 
company’s assets. Conversely, the smaller agency problem is condition which is less 
opportunity for controlling shareholder to make expropriation. This conditions do not lose 
the company’s assets due to expropriation. In such cases, the authorexpect that there is a 
difference between company’s assets between  companies which have agency problem 
and   companies which do not have the agency problem. To test this expection 
empirically, this paper formulates the following research hypothesis. 
Ha: there is a difference between assets between the companywhich has agency 
problem and the company has not agency problem.  
 
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
3. 1. Sample 
Sample of this study is manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange from 2000 to 2007. Sampling was done by purposive sampling because the 
author wants specific information from the target as manufacturing industries listed since 
2000 and  publishes the annual financial statements from 2000 to 2007. 
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3. 2. Data Collection 
Data collection techniques of this study are the data archive. One form of 
collection of archived data is secondary data. Secondary data obtained from several 
sources as Indonesian Stock Exchange for the audited financial statements,  OSIRIS 
database for ultimate ownership, and  Indonesian Business Data Centre for ultimate 
ownership. 
3. 3. Research Variable and Measurement 
Cash flow rights is the percentage of shares held by controlling shareholder (Kim 
and Yi, 2006). Ownership refers to the cash flow rights (Du and Dai, 2005). Cash flow 
rights are financial claims against to the company (La Porta et al., 1999). Cash flow rights 
consist of direct and indirect cash flow rights. Direct cash flow rights is the percentage of 
shares held by shareholder in public companies on behalf of himself. Indirect cash flow 
rights is the number of multiplications shareholders ownership percentage in each chain of 
ownership. Cash flow rights is the sum of the percentage of direct and indirect cash flow 
rights. 
Control rights is the total percentage of shares held by controlling shareholder 
(Kim and Yi, 2006). Control rights are the rights of common stockholders to elect the 
board of directors and company policies such as the issuance of securities, stock splits, 
and substantial changes in the operating company (Du and Dai, 2005). According to La 
Porta et al. (1999), control is  the voting rights to participate in setting corporate 
policy.Control rights include the direct control rights and the indirect control rights. The 
direct control rights are the percentage of shares which is held by controlling shareholder 
on behalf of himself at a company. The direct control rights is equal direct cash flow rights. 
Indirect control rights is the sum of the minimum control in any chain of ownership (La 
Porta et al., 1999). Control rights is the sum of the relationship between the direct control 
rights and indirect control rights. 
Cash flow rights leverage is the difference between control rights and cash flow 
rights. The cash flow rights leverage is the value which is obtained from control rights 
minus cash flow rights. The greater difference between cash flow rights and control rights 
suggests the higher the increasing  control rights exceed cash flow rights. There are some 
researchers refer to this as a leverage ratio of cash flow rights to control rights (Faccio et 
al., 2001; Lemmon and Lins, 2003). In this paper, the agency problem is proxided by the 
cash flow right leverage. Cash flow rights leverage is greater than zero indicates there is 
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agency problem in teh company. While cash flow rights leverage equals zero indicating no 
agency problem. 
According to SFAC No 6 (FASB, 2008), assets are probable future economic 
benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity as result of past transactions or 
events. An asset has three essential characteristics: (a) it embodies a probable future 
benefit involves a capacity, single or in combination with other assets, to contribute 
directly or indirectly to future net cash flows, (b) a particular entity can obtain the benefit 
and control others' access to it, and (c) the transaction or other event giving rise to the 
entity's right to or control of the benefit has already occurred. Assets commonly have other 
features that help identify them. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The following descriptive statistics results are shown in Table 1 as follows. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 KEAGENAN N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ASSET .00 539 2977187641726.9120 8042307381737.82000 346406701739.34920
 1.00 247 1914893003908.7490 3788926530754.78400 241083621955.39430
 
The output of the descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the number of sample 
in the category no agency problems are 539. The mean value of the company's assets 
that do not have the agency problem is Rp2.977.187.641.726, 91. The numbers of sample 
in the category which have agency problem are 247. The mean value of the company’s 
assetswhich has agency problem is Rp1.914.893.003.908, 75. 
These results indicate that the values of the company's assets which do not have 
agency problem are larger than companies which have agency problem. Ithappens 
because the controlling shareholders may expropriate the company’s assets. To further 
test whether statistically significant differences in the value of the assets between 
companies which do not have the agency problem and which have agency problem. 
4.2. The Result of Hypothesis Test  
 The results of hypothesis test are shown as follows. 
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Table 2. The result of Hypothesis Test  
  
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
ASSET Equal 
variances 
assumed 
13.313 .000 1.977 784 .048 
10622946
37818.16
30 
53724514
0476.068
00 
7685415
218.018
89 
2116903
860418.3
0800
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  2.517 783.429 .012 
10622946
37818.16
30 
42204136
7386.025
20 
2338288
46939.6
6540 
1890760
428696.6
6100
 
The analysis in Table 2 shows that the mean difference between companies which 
have agency problem and have no agency problem is Rp1.062.294.637.818.16. This 
value is obtained from the mean value of the company's assets in companies which do not 
have the agency problem is Rp2.977.187.641.726, 91 and the mean value of the 
company’s assetswhich has agency problem is Rp1.914.893.003.908, 75. 
Based on the result of the testing hypothesis indicate that there are differences in 
assets between the companies which have agency problem and have no agency problem 
at the alpha 5%. These results support the notion that agency problem which occur in the 
context of the concentrated ownership is still happening between controlling shareholder 
and non-controlling shareholders. Agency problemharms to non-controlling shareholders 
such as decreasing value of company or company’s assets. The results support several 
previous studies such as Claessens et al. (1999) and Lemmon and Lins (2003). Based on 
the analysis of this data, the research hypothesis states that there is a difference 
company’s assetbetween company which has agency problems and no agency problems 
are supported. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper concludes that the agency problem between controlling shareholder 
and non-controlling in the context of the corporate ownership. Some of the opinion states 
that there is no agency problem on one side can be justified if the opinion is based on the 
view of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that the conflict is between the manager and owner. 
It is less probability to happen and may be almost non-existent because the manager is 
mostly from family members of the controlling shareholder. On the other hand, this opinion 
is not quite right, in Indonesia the agency conflict still remains between the owners and 
the owners such as the controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders. 
  
 
“Governance, Competitive Advantages, and  
Accounting Issues in Emerging Countries” 
 
Airlangga Accounting International Conference & 
Doctoral Colloquium 2012  
 
Nusa Dua, Bali, June 28-29th, 2012  13 
Based on the results of research in this paper concludes that the agency conflict 
which cause the company's assets is lower for the companies which have agency 
problem. This occurs because the controlling shareholder only uses the company as a 
cash cow to satisfy personal interests. It is shown by the difference between control rights 
and cash flow rights of controlling shareholder who motivate and protect controlling 
shareholder to expropriate the company’s assets for privatebenefit. 
Limitations of this study are thatthis research is only to test two mean of assets 
between the companies has agency problem and company has no agency problem. In 
such cases, this study does not control other factors which cause why the company's 
assets in companies with agency problems is lower than the company which is no agency 
problem. This study only focuses on manufacturing companies so the generalization of 
the results of this study is relatively low. 
Subsequent research could study the causality the effect of the agency problem to 
asset by considering several other variables which affect the company's assets. The study 
is a preliminary study in Indonesia which investigates the difference between control rights 
and cash flow rights the controlling shareholder as a proxy for agency problem and 
assets. Therefore, the results of this study can still be developed in subsequent research. 
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